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In Montana, legal presumptions are commonly thought to be
found in two statutes, one covering conclusive presumptions' and
the other, disputable presumptions.2 There are, however, many
more presumptions contained in other statutes, and, in addition,
there are the common law presumptions created by Montana case
law. These less-known presumptions are seldom used because they
are difficult to find or recognize as presumptions. The purpose of
this article is to help practitioners identify and utilize the more
important of these less-known presumptions.
A. Characteristics of Presumptions
Perhaps the knowledge most useful in identifying presumptions
is a clear understanding of what they are, and are not. A definition
is provided by statute in Montana: "A presumption is a deduction
which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts."3
This definition emphasizes one distinguishing feature of a presump-
tion, that the law requires it to be made when certain basic facts
are established. The mandatory nature of presumptions sets them
off from inferences, which the law permits, but does not require.
A second distinguishing feature of presumptions is illustrated
by another Montana statute defining presumptions, specifically
within the Uniform Commercial Code:4
"Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact must
find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence
is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence.
As this definition so clearly suggests, presumptions have the effect
of shifting the burden of persuasion. While inferences or rules of law
may also require that certain facts must be found from the existence
* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Montana Supreme Court Commis-
sion on Rules of Evidence created by Supreme Court Order No. 12729 on April 4, 1974. The
statutes and cases creating the presumptions in this article will be listed as a part of the
Proposed Montana Rules of Evidence in Appendix, Table C.
** Research Director, Montana Supreme Court Commission on Rules of Evidence. B.A.
University of Oregon, 1970; J.D. University of Montana School of Law, 1974,
1. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 93-
1301-6.
2. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-7.
3. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-3.
4. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-1-201(32).
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of other facts, they do not include a shift in the burden of persua-
sion. Some theories argue that presumptions do not actually shift
the burden of persuasion, but only the burden of producing evi-
dence. The distinction between presumptions and rules of law and
inferences remains valid under these theories.5
A final distinguishing feature of presumptions is that they do
not necessarily have to be based on a logical connection between the
fact proved and the fact presumed. In certain instances, public
policy permits a fact to be presumed from another fact without an
intervening logical relationship. For example, ownership is pre-
sumed from the basic fact of possession. The policy behind the
presumption favors the prior possessor and contributes to the stabil-
ity of estates, but there is no logical basis for concluding that a
possessor is necessarily an owner.'
Curiously, a presumption based on public policy rather than
logic would not be a presumption under the principal Montana
definition. That definition describes a presumption as a type of
"deduction". "Deduction" implies a logical relationship between
the fact proved and the fact presumed. A better definition, which
includes both logical and public policy presumptions, is contained
in Rule 301(a) of the proposed Montana Rules of Evidence, provid-
ing that "A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law
requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or
otherwise established in the action."' 7
B. Reasons for Presumptions
There are many reasons for the creation of presumptions. Per-
haps the best summary is provided by Professor Morgan,8 who states
that there are at least seven different reasons for the creation of
presumptions:
1. To make unnecessary the introduction of evidence upon an
issue made by the pleadings but not likely to be subject to serious
dispute. [Example: the presumption of sanity where sanity must
be proven.]
2. To avoid a procedural impasse in a situation where evidence
of the presumed fact is lacking. [Example: the presumption of
death after seven years absence without tidings.]
3. To avoid such an impasse created by the impossibility of se-
5. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1972) 803 [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].
6. Id. at 807.
7. This definition is based upon WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE, § 600(a)
[hereinafter cited as CAL. Ev. CODE].
8. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE (1962), 32-34.
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curing legally competent evidence of the presumed fact.
[Example: where survival of a common disaster is at issue, the
presumption is that one person died before another.]
4. To produce a result in accord with the preponderance of proba-
bility, "common experience shows the facts to be so generally true
that courts may notice the truth."
5. To require the party having peculiar means of access to the
facts and evidence of the facts to make them known to the court.
[Example: when freight is delivered in a damaged condition, the
presumption is that the damage was done by the last carrier.]
6. To reach a result deemed socially desirable wherever the basic
fact exists. [Example: long-continued possession of real property
as if it were owned by the possessor results in a presumption of a
lost grant to the possessor.]
7. To reach a result deemed desirable for a combination of two
or more of the foregoing reasons. [Example: the presumption of
the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, supported by Numbers
3, 4, and 6.]
Most presumptions are created because the existence of the
condition presumed is "so probable that it is sensible and time-
saving to assume the truth of (it) . . . until the adversary disproves
it."' The reason for the creation of a specific presumption often
dictates the quantum of proof required to overcome it as well as the
effect given to it.
C. Types of Presumptions in Montana Law
The most basic distinction among presumptions is that be-
tween disputable and conclusive presumptions. Although the basic
facts giving rise to either may be disputed by the party against
whom the presumption operates, once the basic facts of a conclusive
presumption have been established, it must be found, and cannot
be disputed at all. In contrast, once the facts giving rise to a disputa-
ble presumption are established, it may be controverted, and must
be found only if the presumption has not been overcome by the
person against whom it operates.
Conclusive presumptions have been called rules of substantive
law,' 0 because there is no shifting of any burden of persuasion when
they operate. For similar reasons, the distinction between disputa-
ble presumptions, inferences, and rules of law is sometimes difficult
to make, because there may be no mention of burden of persuasion,
and no clear-cut test for determining the burden.
Presumptions are also distinguished according to source. Thus,
9. MCCORMICK, p. 807 n. 7.
10. Id. at 804.
1976]
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there are statutory presumptions and those arising from case law,
usually called common law presumptions. Four possible categories
flow from these two means of distinguishing presumptions: conclu-
sive statutory presumptions, conclusive common law presumptions,
disputable statutory presumptions, and disputable common law
presumptions. Only three of these categories of presumptions are
recognized in Montana; conclusive common law presumptions are
prohibited by statute."
The following sections will discuss the more significant of the
presumptions found within Montana law which fall within these
categories. The categorization of many of these presumptions is
arbitrary. For example, those presumptions arising from case law
which are based on essentiallythe same principle as statutory pre-
sumptions are included with the statutory presumptions, even
though they are technically common law presumptions. It is not
intended that this writing become an authority on the category in
which a presumption belongs. The intention here is merely to indi-
cate some of the presumptions which exist in Montana.
II. PRESUMPTIONS IN MONTANA LAW
A. Statutory Conclusive Presumptions
As noted earlier in this article, conclusive presumptions are
based on statute only and are actually substantive rules of law.
They are to be distinguished from other presumptions in two ways:
(1) once their basic facts are established they must be found and
cannot be controverted, and (2) they can only be declared by stat-
ute. The controlling statute in Montana on conclusive presump-
tions12 states: "The following presumptions, and no others, are
deemed conclusive . . ." and goes on to list seven subdivisions, the
last subdivision 3 stating: "Any other presumption which, by
statute, is expressly made conclusive." [Emphasis added.] The
conclusive presumptions listed there are:
1. "A malicious and guilty intent, from the deliberate com-
mission of an unlawful act, for the purpose of injuring another."
This presumption has been used to support a court's reasoning, 4 but
never used squarely in a holding. The only interpretation given it
was dicta and only restated what the subdivision plainly says.'5
11. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-6(7). Cases construing the statute in this manner include
Hicks v. Stillwater County, 84 Mont. 38, 46, 274 P.2d 296 (1929); Roseneau Foods Inc. v.
Coleman, 140 Mont. 572, 577, 374 P.2d 87 (1962).
12. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-6.
13. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-6(7).
14. Wray v. Great Falls Paper Co., 72 Mont. 461, 466, 234 P. 486 (1925).
15. State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 581, 190 P. 107 (1920).
[Vol. 37
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2. "The truth of facts recited, from the recital in a written
instrument between the parties thereto, or their successors in inter-
est by a subsequent title; but this rule does not apply to the recital
of a consideration."'" This presumption has not been cited very
often, and then only as dicta.'7 In two cases the subdivision has been
used not to point out that whatever is stated in a written instrument
is conclusively presumed to be true, but to point out the exception,
that the amount of consideration is a disputable presumption under
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-7(39)"s or "subject to explanation."' 9
3. "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be per-
mitted to falsify it."20 This is one of the most important and often
used of all conclusive presumptions. It is the statutory declaration
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.2' However, in cases applying
the doctrine, the statutory presumption has been used only in con-
junction with the following six elements required by case law:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-
amounting to a representation or a concealment of material
facts.
2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time
of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that
knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him.
3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when it was
acted upon by him.
4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with
the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or
under such circumiances that it is both natural and probable that
it will be so acted upon.
5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party and thus
relying, he must be led to act upon it.
6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his
position for the worse; in other words, he must so act that he would
suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter
what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted to
repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it.2
16. For a similar provision see CAL. Ev. CODE § 622.
17. Angus v. Mariner et al., 85 Mont. 365, 374, 278 P. 996 (1924).
18. Dubbels v. Thompson, 49 Mont. 550, 557, 143 P. 986 (1914).
19. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co. v. Neville et al., 79 Mont. 550, 564, 257 P. 1061 (1927).
20. For a similar provision see CAL. Ev. CODE § 623.
21. State ex rel. Howeth v. D. A. Davidson Co., 163 Mont. 355, 517 P.2d 722 (1974);
Hustad v. Reed, 133 Mont. 211, 233, 321 P.2d 1083 (1958); City of Billings v. Pierce Packing
Co., 117 Mont. 255, 266, 161 P.2d 636 (1945).
22. State ex rel. Howeth v. D. A. Davidson Co., supra; Hustad v. Reed, supra; City of
19761
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By requiring the common law elements of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, the construction of this subdivision has made it the best
example of a rule of law that is not really a presumption at all. Once
the basic facts (the six elements) are established, whatever was
relied upon is conclusively presumed the truth.
4. "A tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of the commencement of the relation." 3 This subdivi-
sion has not been used or construed. However, the general principle
expressed by it has been announced in one case."
5. "The issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is
not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate." 5 This
subdivision has been applied to find that a child was legitimate as
against claims of illegitimacy." It should be noted that there are two
relevant disputable presumptions that concern legitimacy: R.C.M.
1947, §§ 61-101 and 93-1301-7(31). The distinction between the con-
clusive presumption and these latter presumptions has not been
clearly stated by the Montana supreme court. In re Wray's Estate7
noted all three of these presumptions, the court finding that the
conclusive presumption required cohabitation. Since the husband
and wife were not cohabiting, the subdivision did not apply. A clear
distinction gained by reading these statutes is that the disputable
presumptions of legitimacy apply only where there is wedlock; they
are not concerned with cohabitation'
6. "The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this
code to be conclusive; but such judgment or order must be allegsd
in the pleadings, if there be an opportunity to do so; if there be no
such opportunity, the judgment or order may be used as evidence."
This provision has only been cited in one case, in which it was found
not to apply. However, the court did hold that a judgment or order
of a court is conclusive only as to the matters involved in the pro-
ceeding.2" Judqments or orders are declared conclusive in other sec-
tions of the code: for example, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2820, giving con-
clusive effect to judgments and decrees where service of summons
is by publication or where unknown heirs, devises, and owners of
Billings v. Pierce Packing Co., supra; Gerard v. Sanner, 110 Mont. 71, 80, 103 P.2d 314 (1940);
Mundt v. Mallon, 106 Mont. 242, 249, 76 P.2d 326 (1938); Lindbloom v. Employer's Liability
Assurance Corp., 88 Mont. 488, 494, 295 P. 1007 (1930); note that the six elements originated
in the Lindbloom case as a quote from 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) 1644.
23. For a similar provision see CAL. Ev. CODE § 624.
24. Cook et al. v. Hudson, 110 Mont. 263, 288, 103 P.3d 1137 (1940).
25. For a similar provision see CAL. Ev. CODE § 621. See also the recently adopted
Uniform Parentage Act, R.C.M. 1947, § 61-301 et. seq., especially § 61-305, concerning a
presumption of paternity.
26. In re Pepin's Estate, 53 Mont. 240, 248, 163 P. 104 (1917).
27. 93 Mont. 525, 535, 19 P.2d 1051 (1933).
28. Hustad v. Reed, supra note 19 at 224-5.
[Vol. 37
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property are involved; § 93-1001-20, giving conclusive effect to judg-
ments or orders of the courts of this state or of the United States in
respect to specific matters covered; and § 91-3516, providing for
settlement of accounts in probate.
There are other conclusive presumptions to be found in the
Code in addition to those stated in § 93-1301-6. While some of the
statutes have been construed by Montana case law, the presump-
tions contained in them have not. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3914 conclu-
sively presumes that a conveyance of any right, title or interest
under the Urban Renewal Act in compliance with the provisions of
the act has been executed. Section 16-4415 states that "it will be
conclusively presumed that an area which is within fifteen hundred
(1500) feet of a proposed or existing sanitary sewer, is contributory
to the pollution of a watercourse in the proposed area". Section 45-
414 conclusively presumes that a party purchasing property subject
to a logger's lien is not a bona fide owner of that property unless
certain conditions are met. Sections 81-430 and 81-2613 conclusively
presume that if any part of their respective acts are found invalid,
the remainder of the act shall be valid. Section 84-5606 conclusively
presumes that all taxes paid pursuant to this section are "direct
taxes on the retail consumer precollected for the purpose of conveni-
ence and facility only". Sections 92-822 and 92-1360 conclusively
presume that the orders, rules, regulations, findings, decisions, and
awards are reasonable and lawful. Section 92-1315(B)(1)(b)(1) cre-
ates an irrebutable presumption of total disability when certain
requirements are met.
A conclusive presumption which has been used extensively,
R.C.M. 1947, § 29-208, states:
Every transfer of personal property, other than a thing in action,
or a ship or cargo at sea, or in a foreign port, and every lien thereon,
other than a mortgage, when allowed by law, and a contract of
bottomry or respondentia, is conclusively presumed, if made by a
person having at the time the possession or control of the property,
and not accompanied by an immediate delivery, and followed by
an actual and continued change of possession of the things trans-
ferred, to be fraudulent, and therefore void, against those who are
his creditors while he remains in possession, and the successors in
interest of such creditors, and against any persons on whom his
estate devolves in trust for the benefit of others than himself, and
against purchasers or encumbrancers in good faith subsequent to
the transfer.
The statute in substance provides that where a transfer of personal
property by its possessor is not accompanied by an immediate deliv-
ery and followed by an actual or continued change of possession to
1976]
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the transferee, it will be conclusively presumed to be fraudulent."
The purpose of the statute is "to require notice to the world of the
transfer" so that certain persons ("creditors, and purchasers or en-
cumbrancers in good faith") may be protected. "It is designed to
prevent fraud."I"
The effect of making this a conclusive presumption is to disal-
low admission of evidence on the question of fraud."' Therefore the
only dispute which may be made concerns the basic facts of this
presumption: that the person either possessed the property, or deliv-
ered it, or that there was a continued change of possession. Once
these have been established, the transfer is conclusively presumed
fraudulent and is therefore void.
R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-3-406(2), part of the Montana Uniform
Probate Code, provides a conclusive presumption in regard to self-
proved wills:
(2) If the will is self-proved, compliance with signature require-
ments for execution is conclusively presumed and other require-
ments of execution are presumed subject to rebuttal without the
testimony of any witness upon filing the will and the acknowledge-
ment and affidavits annexed or attached thereto, unless there is
proof of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or affidavit.
The Editorial Board Comment to this section states that the conclu-
sive presumption would apply to the question of whether the will
was properly executed but not to questions of "undue influence, lack
of testamentary capacity, revocation or any relevant proof that the
testator was unaware of the contents of the document."
B. Disputable Statutory Presumptions
There are at least 175 disputable statutory presumptions."
These can be distinguished from conclusive presumptions in that
the presumptions themselves, as well as their basic facts, may be
disputed, and in that the basic principles upon which they rest are
stated in a statute. Because of limitations of space, only some of
them will be discussed.
R.C.M. 1947, § 1301-7 contains the largest number of these
presumptions, listing 39. The first is: "That a person is innocent of
a crime or wrong." This classic presumption of innocence used in
29. O.W. Perry Co. v. Mullan, 81 Mont. 482, 485, 263 P. 976 (1928).
30. Id. at 486.
31. Taylor v. Malta Mercantile Co., 47 Mont. 342, 346, 132 P. 549 (1913) and R.C.M.
1947, § 29-210 providing how fraud is to be determined "except as otherwise provided in
section 29-208."
32. A complete list of these presumptions will be found in Appendix Table C, Proposed
Montana Rules of Evidence.
[Vol. 37
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all criminal cases is also contained in another section. 3 (The repeti-
tion elsewhere of presumptions found in this section is common.) It
has been used often in civil cases, 34 in combination with other
provisions of this section. For example, it has been used with subdi-
vision 4: "That a person takes ordinary care of his own concerns"; 35
subdivision 15: "That official duty has been regularly performed";
subdivision 33: "That the law has been obeyed";" subdivision 19:
"That transactions have been fair and regular" ;37 and with subdivi-
sion 20: "That the ordinary course of business has been followed."3 8
This subdivision has been used in this manner only to support the
court's reasoning in finding in favor of the defendant.
The second presumption is "that an unlawful act was done with
unlawful intent." It has been used exclusively in criminal litigation.
In one case, this disputable presumption was used with the conclu-
sive presumption of malicious and guilty intent from an unlawful
act, 39 and in another was used by itself in a specific factual situation
(the repeated shooting into the vital parts of the human body with
a deadly weapon) to establish intent.'"
The third presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act." It has been used to show intent
to fraudulently convey property,4' to show that a motion was made
for other than judicial purposes,4 2 and to show malice in a malicious
prosecution action. 3 In criminal cases it has been used to show
criminal intent44 and the intent to waive rights, when combined with
subdivision 27: "That acquiesence followed from a belief that the
thing acquiesced in was conformable to the right or fact. 4 5
The fourth presumption is "that a person takes ordinary care
of his own concerns." It has been used in civil cases, primarily as
33. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2901.
34. Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne, 69 Mont. 140, 147, 220 P.2d 1114 (1923); State
ex rel. Tillman v. District Court, 101 Mont. 176, 181, 53 P.2d 107 (1936); Kern v. Eichhorn,
111 Mont. 171, 176, 107 P.2d 873 (1940); same case, 112 Mont. 262, 264, 124 P.2d 311 (1942).
However, the presumption is also used in criminal cases, for example, State v. McLeod, 131
Mont. 478, 489, 311 P.2d 400 (1957).
35. Hansen et al. v. Johnson, 90 Mont. 597, 609, 4 P.2d 1088 (1931).
36. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Cut Bank Implement Co., 107 Mont. 117, 123, 53 P.2d 116
(1935).
37. Gagnon v. Jones, 103 Mont. 365, 367, 62 P.2d 683 (1936) and Whitney v. Northwest
Greyhound, 125 Mont. 528, 541, 242 P.2d 257 (1952) also using subd. 33.
38. Johnson v. Kaiser, 104 Mont. 261, 276, 65 P.2d 1179 (1937).
39. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-6(1); State v. Smith, supra note 14.
40. State v. McLeod, supra note 31.
41. National Bank of Anaconda v. Yegen, 83 Mont. 265, 280, 271 P. 612 (1928).
42. State ex rel. Hall v. Niewoehner, 116 Mont. 437, 453, 155 P.2d 205 (1944).
43. Rickman v. Safeway Stores, 124 Mont. 451, 456, 227 P.2d 607 (1951).
44. State v. McLeod, supra note 31.
45. Campus v. State et al., 157 Mont. 321, 326, 483 P.2d 275 (1971).
1976]
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an aid to the determination of the existence of negligence or contri-
butory negligence." It has also been applied in an action to set aside
conveyances of real estate47 and in another dealing with the con-
struction of a contract for sale of land," in which it was held that
several presumptions from this section did not apply because the
evidence showed otherwise. It has not been applied when there were
facts contrary to the presumption. 9
The eighth presumption is "that a thing delivered by one to
another belonged to the latter." It has been used with the eleventh
presumption: "That things which a person possesses are owned by
him," and the twelfth presumption "that a person is the owner of
property from exercising acts of ownership over it, or from common
reputation of his ownership."50
The fifteenth presumption, "that official duty has been regu-
larly performed," is the most widely used of these presumptions.
Closely related is the sixteenth presumption: "That a court or judge,
acting as such, whether in this state or any other state or country,
was acting in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction." These two
presumptions have been employed so often that their use has re-
sulted in many courts referring to them without citation to the
statute. Other common presumptions are:
24. That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of the mail.
26. That a person not heard from in seven years is dead.
32. That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual
with things of that nature.
34. [The ancient documents rule] That a document or writing
more than thirty years old is genuine, when the same has been
since generally acted upon as genuine, by persons having an inter-
est in the question, and its custody has been satisfactorily ex-
plained.
Other statutes contain presumptions covering many other areas
of the law; they are so numerous that individual attention cannot
be given to each one. For convenience they are divided into general
areas of the law in the following discussion.
46. Harrington v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co., 37 Mont. 169, 172, 95 P. 8 (1908);
Meehan v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 43 Mont. 72, 80, 114 P. 781 (1911); Doorley v. Goodman,
71 Mont. 529, 536, 230 P. 779 (1924); Rau v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 87 Mont. 521, 544,
289 P. 580 (1930).
47. Johnson v. Kaiser, supra note 34.
48. Ryan v. Bloom, 120 Mont. 443, 450, 186 P.2d 879 (1947).
49. Osterholm v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 193, 202, 199 P. 253 (1921); Roberts
v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 67 Mont. 472, 478, 216 P. 332 (1923); Monforton
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 138 Mont. 191, 207, 355 P.2d 501 (1960); Knowlton v. Sundaker,
150 Mont. 438, 449, 436 P.2d 98 (1968).
50. Cuerth v. Arbogast, 48 Mont. 209, 217, 136 P. 383 (1913).
[Vol. 37
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Disputable statutory presumptions concerned with the con-
struction and determination of intent of terms are: that a written
instrument shows a presumption that there was consideration; 5'
that words of a contract are to be construed most strongly against
the party who caused the uncertainty to exist and this is presumed
to be the promisor, unless that party is the government, in which
case it is presumed to have been caused by the private party;52 that
where parties unite in a promise and receive benefit, the promise is
presumed joint and several;53 that where a promise is made by one
person but executed by several, it is presumed to be joint and sev-
eral;54 that where a contract is revised, it is presumed that all parties
"intended to make an equitable and conscientious agreement"; 55
and that terms of a contract are presumed to be used in their ordi-
nary meaning or "primary and general acceptation.""6 Another pre-
sumption associated with contracts is an exception to the rule that
contracts fixing damages are void:57 where it would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix the actual damages, the parties may
agree upon an amount which is presumed to be the amount of dam-
ages sustained. 58
2. Criminal Law
Statutory presumptions in this area are important because an
element of certain crimes may be established by a presumption. The
crime of assault as defined by the Montana Criminal Code of 197319
presumes reasonable apprehension "in any case in which a person
knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another whether
or not the offender believes the firearm to be loaded." To establish
criminal jurisdiction in murder cases, if the body is found in this
state, "the death is presumed to have occurred within the state."' "
Two other statutes, dealing with the possession of machine guns,
include a presumption that the possession or use is "for [an] offen-
sive or aggressive purpose" upon certain conditions.' The presence
51. R.C.M. 1947, § 13-510.
52. R.C.M. 1947, § 13-720.
53. R.C.M. 1947, § 13-725.
54. R.C.M. 1947, § 13-726.
55. R.C.M. 1947, § 17-902.
56. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-18.
57. R.C.M. 1947, § 13-804.
58. R.C.M. 1947, § 13-805.
59. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-201(1)(d).
60. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-304.
61. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-8-204 and 94-8-208.
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of the defendant during his trial is "conclusively deemed" unless the
record shows the contrary."2
A presumption in favor of one class of defendants is that per-
sons convicted under the dangerous drug act who are under 21 years
of age are presumed to be entitled to a deferred imposition of sent-
ence.63 The only other presumption in favor of the defendant is the
classic presumption of innocence. 4
3. Damages
Several statutes use presumptions to establish damages in cer-
tain actions. Damages for conversion are presumed to be the value
of the property, with interest, or the highest market value without
interest, and fair compensation for efforts to recover the property. 5
The estimation of damages for the value of a written instrument is
presumed to be the equivalent value of property to which it entitles
the owner. 6 Finally, it is presumed that the breach of an agreement
to transfer real property cannot be adequately compensated in
money damages, but that the breach of an agreement to transfer
personal property can be so compensated. 7
4. Death
A person is presumed to be dead at the end of seven years if he
has not been heard from, and if his "absence is not satisfactorily
explained after diligent search."68 A finding of presumed death
under the Federal Missing Persons Act is prima facie evidence of
death. " Further, any report issued pursuant to law by a federal
officer or employee has the same effect.7"
5. Family Law
The determination of the legitimacy of a child is covered not
only in the statutes on conclusive7 and statutory72 presumptions,
but also in the Uniform Parentage Act. The Act adopts several
presumptions to determine whether a man is the father of a child.7
62. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1904.
63. R.C.M. 1947, § 54-133.
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2901.
65. R.C.M. 1947, § 17-404.
66. R.C.M. 1947, § 17-604.
67. R.C.M. 1947, § 17-804.
68. R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-1-107(3), effective July 1, 1975.
69. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1001-35.
70. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1001-41.
71. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-6(5), discussed infra.
72. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-7(31).
73. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-305.
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Additionally, there is a presumption of the legitimacy of children
born within ten months of the dissolution of a marriage 4 and of the
legitimacy of all children born in wedlock. 5 Questions of support of
the family are also covered to an extent by presumptions: all work
done by a married person, other than that for spouse and children,
is presumed to be for "his separate account" unless there is a writ-
ten agreement to the contrary."8 Further, while a married person is
not bound to support his spouse's children from a former marriage,
if he does so it is presumed that the support is given as a parent,
even though this support creates no obligation."
6. Immunity From Liability
Several statutes declare that when an official acts in good faith
in carrying out his duty under a particular act, he shall be immune
from liability. This includes making reports under the Abused, Neg-
lected and Dependent Children and Youth Act" and three acts
granting immunity in the collection of stray animal stock. '9 Another
statute granting immunity from liability presumes that a doctor
acts in good faith in reporting a gun shot or stab wound. 0
7. Landlord and Tenant
Where residential property is rented for an indefinite period of
time, it is presumed to be for the period of time for which the rent
is paid.8' However, where commercial property is rented for an in-
definite period, the term is presumed to be for one year unless other-
wise expressed." If a lessee continues in possession after the expira-
tion of a lease and if the lessor accepts rent, "the parties are pre-
sumed to have renewed" the lease on the same terms 11 and for the
same time, not to exceed one year. Under a new law, if a leasehold
agreement requires the tenant to provide a deposit to the landlord,
it is presumed to be a security deposit.84
74. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-102.
75. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-101.
76. R.C.M. 1947, § 36-116.
77. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-117.
78. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1306.
79. R.C.M. 1947, § 46-1606, Horse Herd Districts; § 46-1813, Abandoned Horses, and §
46-2326(S), Grass Conservation.
80. R.C.M. 1947, § 66-1051.
81. R.C.M. 1947, § 42-204.
82. R.C.M. 1947, § 42-203.
83. R.C.M. 1947, § 42-205.
84. R.C.M. 1947, § 42-301(3).
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8. Liquor
Where it is proved that an offense against the State Liquor
Control Act has been committed by any person employed by the
owner of an establishment, the owner "shall prima facie be deemed
to be a party to the offense committed, and shall be liable to the
penalties prescribed for the offense.""5 When a court is trying a case,
it is "at liberty to infer" that the liquor in question is intoxicating."
The statute that proscribes driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs establishes certain amounts of alcohol
in the defendant's blood as a presumption that he may be under the
influence of alcohol. If there is 0.05 per cent or less alcohol in the
blood it is presumed that the defendant was not under the influence;
if there is between 0.05 and 0.10 per cent there is no presumption
but this may be used as evidence; if there is 0.10 per cent or more
there is a presumption that the defendant was under the influence. 7
9. Negotiable Instruments
The part of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with com-
mercial paper uses a number of presumptions. Many of these rest
on the principle that what is written on the instrument is correct;
for example, that the date is presumed correct,88 that signatures are
presumed genuine," that endorsers are presumed liable in the order
in which their signatures appear," and that certain periods are pre-
sumed to be a reasonable time for presentment.9 Others include the
presumption of creation of a guaranty when words of guaranty are
added with a signature," that in'an action against a drawee the
measure of liability is presumed to be the face amount of the instru-
ment, 9 and that evidence of dishonor is created by presumption
when listed facts occur. 4 There is also a presumption of agency
status of endorsing banks in the collection process95 and that the
signature on a negotiable security in any action on a security is
presumed to be genuine or authorized.
85. R.C.M. 1947, § 4-207.
86. R.C.M. 1947, § 4-208.
87. R.C.M. 1947, § 32-2142(1), (2) and (3).
88. R.C.M. 1947, § 37A-3-114.
89. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-3-307(1).
90. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-3-414(2).
91. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-3-503.
92. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-3-416(4).
93. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-3-419(2).
94. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-3-510.
95. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-4-201(1).
96. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-8-105.
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Inadverse possession cases, it is presumed that the person hold-
ing title to the land is in possession of the property and that the
occupation by any other person is in subordination to that title,
unless the property has been held adversely for five years. 7 A Mon-
tana curative title statute states that when a deed to real property
has been made prior to 1900, and the deed does not acknowledge
whether the grantor had a wife, it is presumed that the grantor had
no wife.9 The statutes concerning fixtures use presumptions to de-
termine the existence of fixtures to land" and to mines. 00
When property is conveyed several presumptions come into
operation. In a conveyance of realty, the grantor is presumed to be
the sole and separate owner of the property.' °' When a person grants
a thing, he is presumed to grant whatever is essential to its use.' 2
A grant properly executed is presumed to have been delivered at its
date.' 3 Fee simple is presumed to pass by a grant of real property
unless the contrary is intended.' 4 Land with boundaries along a
street or road is presumed to be owned to the center thereof.' 5
11. Unfair Trade Practices
Under a statute that sets out the procedure for establishing cost
surveys, once the cost percentage has been established, that percen-
tage is presumed to be the actual "cost of doing business" and
"overhead expense."'' 0 The basic "cost of doing business by the
retailer" is presumed to be ten per cent of the "basic cost of
cigarettes" to the retailer in the absence of proof to the contrary, as
provided by the Montana Cigarette Sales Act.'07 Any order, express
or implied, made to any motor vehicle dealer by a manufacturer,
that the dealer will finance sales through any person affiliated with
or controlled by that manufacturer, is presumed to have been made
by or at the direction of that manufacturer.'08 Sending unsolicited
goods through the mail is deemed a gift, and the recipient is allowed
97. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2507.
98. R.C.M. 1947, § 39-131.
99. R.C.M. 1947, § 67-209.
100. R.C.M. 1947, § 67-210.
101. R.C.M. 1947, § 9-818.
102. R.C.M. 1947, § 49-114.
103. R.C.M. 1947, § 67-1510.
104. R.C.M. 1947, § 67-1608.
105. R.C.M. 1947, § 67-713.
106. R.C.M. 1947, § 51-114.
107. R.C.M. 1947, § 51-303.
108. R.C.M. 1947, § 51-204.
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to use or dispose of the goods without any obligation to the sender.'
Under another act, where a home solicitation sale is cancelled and
the seller does not demand possession within a reasonable time, the
purchaser is no longer obligated to pay for the goods; a reasonable
time is presumed to be 40 days."0
12. Water Rights
An appropriation is deemed abandoned if the appropriator in-
tends to abandon or to cease complying with terms of that right."'
Under this statute if an appropriator ceases to use his rights and
there was water available for a period of ten years, there is a prima
facie presumption that he has abandoned his right."' All acts of the
commissioners of drainage districts are presumed regular, as they
are declared to be public officers."' Under the Floodway Manage-
ment and Regulation Act, the distinction between "drainway" and
"watercourse" is whether either gives direction to a current of water
more than or less than nine months of the year;"4 in case of doubt,
a presumption exists in favor of the current being a watercourse.
Under this act, where wrongful failure to comply with the act is
shown, a presumption is created that an obstruction was the proxi-
mate cause of flooding.15
13. Workman's Compensation
There are several presumptions used in the Workman's Com-
pensation Act. It is presumed that an employee has elected to be
bound by the particular provisions of the Act unless he affirmatively
declines to be bound."' The same presumption carries over to work-
ers when the employer procures work to be done by contract."7
Under the Occupational Diseases Act, certain diseases are pre-
sumed to render a worker totally disabled, and under certain condi-
tions, contracting a disease will be presumed to be work-
connected." 8
109. R.C.M. 1947, § 67-1706.1.
110. R.C.M. 1949, § 85-506.
111. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-894(1).
112. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-894(2).
113. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-2815.
114. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-3503.
115. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-3514.
116. R.C.M. 1947, § 92-209.
117. R.C.M. 1947, § 92-605.
118. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 92-1303, 93-1315.
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C. Disputable Common Law Presumptions
Many presumptions stated in cases are based on a statutory
principle which may or may not be a presumption. One example of
this is found in R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-7(15), stating that official
duty is presumed performed; case law adopts this principle and
finds that proceedings are presumed regularly carried out and that
all necessary requirements are met.'19 A large number of common
law presumptions closely related to this principle involve the princi-
ple that on appeal the conduct of a trial is assumed in all respects
to have been proper. Included are the following presumptions: that
all evidence necessary to support the judgment will be presumed on
appeal; 2 ' that in a non-jury case, it will be presumed that the judge
considered only competent evidence in reaching his findings; 2' that
a judgment or order will be presumed proper;'22 and, conversely,
that error will not be presumed, but must be affirmatively shown
by appellant. 3 When a motion for new trial is granted without
specification of the grounds, the presumption arises that the court
in its discretion granted the motion on grounds of insufficient evi-
dence to justify the verdict.'24 The same type of presumptions apply
to the appellate process. For example: it will be presumed that an
appeal bond is sufficient where no exception is taken.2 5 Proceedings
dealing with bills of exceptions are presumed to be regular. 2 '
The presumption of correctness does not apply in several in-
stances: where judgments are obtained by constructive service,'27
and where the trial court has lost jurisdiction. 2 8 Further, where a
record of testimony is available, the presumption that the testimony
119. In re Horemann's Estate, 108 Mont. 386, 394, 91 P.2d 394 (1939) found that re-
quirements were met in adoption proceedings; State ex rel. Hamilton v. District Court, 102
Mont. 341, 348, 57 P.2d 1227 (1936) found that parties are presumed to be of full age.
120. Story v. Black, 5 Mont. 26, 41, 1 P. 1 (1883) and a long line of cases.
121. Montana Ore Packing Co. v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co., 25 Mont.
427, 432, 65 P. 420 (1901) and a long line of cases.
122. Rumney Land & Cattle Co. v. Detroit and Montana Cattle Co., 19 Mont. 557, 559,
49 P. 395 (1897) and a long line of cases.
123. State v. Matt, 29 Mont. 292, 307, 74 P. 728 (1903); Swain v. McMillan, 30 Mont.
433, 441, 76 P. 943 (1904) and a long line of cases.
124. Norton v. Great Northern Railway Co., 78 Mont. 273, 285, 254 P. 165 (1927) and
Brennan v. Mayo, 100 Mont. 439, 447, 50 P.2d 245 (1935).
125. O'Neil v. State Savings Bank et al., 34 Mont. 521, 527, 87 P. 970 (1906).
126. Since Rule 46, MONTANA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, no longer requires bills of
exceptions, this presumption is presented as an example of how a principle has been applied.
See, Montana Ore Purchasing v. Lindsey, 25 Mont. 24, 29, 63 P. 719 (1901); White v. Kemper,
25 Mont. 432, 437, 65 P. 422 (1901); and State v. Tate, 55 Mont. 343, 344, 177 P. 243 (1918).
127. Palmer v. McMaster, 8 Mont. 61, 66, 85 P. 739 (1906).
128. Evans v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 51 Mont. 107, 112, 149 P. 715 (1915).
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supports the trial court's actions is not followed.'29 Where the same
stipulated facts are submitted to both the trial and supreme courts
the presumption that the trial court's findings are correct does not
have the same force as in other cases.'3 The presumption that the
judge considered only competent evidence is not followed where the
excluded evidence was important and apparently used by the trial
court in its findings,' 3' where the excluded evidence went to the
heart of the matter, 32 where the record shows that recitals contained
in the judgment were untrue,' 33 or where the equities are clearly in
favor of the losing party. 34
The presumption of regularity has been variously followed
when default judgments are concerned. It will be presumed that the
court followed the law when entering a default judgment,'33 and that
there was neglect when the statutory period was permitted to run.' 3
Jurisdiction will not, however, be presumed on appeal from a de-
fault judgment.'37 The presumption that the default judgment was
supported by the pleadings does not obtain when they are before the
court;'13 neither does it obtain when proper notice was not received
by the defendants.' 39
Other applications of the presumption of regularity include:
that an attorney's acts are presumed regular and done pursuant to
the client's authority;'4 ° that a federal court discharging a bankrupt
had jurisdiction and that its proceedings were regular;' 4' that pro-
ceedings in criminal cases were regular;' that an order amending
minutes was proper;4 3 that sentencing before a two-day interval had
expired was proper;'" that evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury's
verdict;' 45 that instructions to the jury were correct' 4 and were fol-
129. State ex rel. Ellan v. District Court, 97 Mont. 160, 168, 33 P.2d 526 (1934).
130. McCracken v. Liquor Control Board, 115 Mont. 347, 352, 143 P.2d 891 (1943).
131. Anaconda Copper Mining v. Heinze, 27 Mont. 161, 172, 69 P. 909 (1902).
132. State ex rel. Rankin v. Martin, 68 Mont. 392, 404, 219 P. 632 (1923).
133. Regis v. District Court, 102 Mont. 74, 85, 55 P.2d 1295 (1936).
134. Cedar Creek Oil and Gas Co. v. Archer et al., 112 Mont. 477, 489, 117 P.2d 265
(1941).
135. Butte Butchering Co. v. Clarke, 19 Mont. 306, 311, 48 P. 303 (1897).
136. Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. McCue, 71 Mont. 99, 103, 288 P. 761 (1924).
137. Griffith v. Montana Wheat Growers Assoc., 75 Mont. 466, 473, 244 P. 277 (1926).
138. State ex rel. Costello v. District Court, 86 Mont. 387, 394, 284 P. 128 (1930).
139. Holen v. Phelps, 131 Mont. 146, 152, 308 P.2d 624 (1957).
140. Pullen v. City of Butte, 45 Mont. 46, 56, 121 P. 878 (1911); Rieckoff v. Woodhull,
106 Mont. 22, 32, 75 P.2d 56 (1937).
141. Ragsdale v. Botham, 81 Mont. 408, 419, 263 P. 293 (1928).
142. Territory v. Clayton, 8 Mont. 1, 13, 19 P. 293 (1888).
143. State v. Lu Sing, 34 Mont. 31, 40, 85 P. 521 (1906).
144. State v. Mich, 36 Mont. 168, 175, 92 P. 459 91907.
145. State v. Wong Sun, 114 Mont. 185, 193, 133 P.2d 761 (1943).
146. Black v. Black, 5 Mont. 15, 24, 2 P. 317 (1883); Howard v. Fraser, 83 Mont. 194,
199, 271 P. 444 (1928).
[Vol. 37
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 37 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/4
1976] PRESUMPTIONS
lowed;'47 that a jury's decision was supported by the evidence 4 ' and
was reached properly; 4 ' that an assessment was properly made; 150
that the necessity for passage of an ordinance existed; 51 that a 40-
acre tract was included within the corporate limits of a town;'12 that
proceedings on a motion for new trial met all necessary require-
ments; 5 3 that proceedings generally were regular and that notice
was given; 54 that conditions precedent to delivery of an oil and gas
lease held in escrow had been met under the doctrine that those
things which should have been done have been done; 5 5 and that
orders and findings of the State Board of Equalization are presumed
correct and justified by the evidence.' 6
The following disputable common law presumptions are cre-
ated entirely by case law and are not found in any statute. They
cover almost every area of the law.
1. Attorneys
An attorney is presumed innocent in disbarment proceedings. 15 7
An order allowing attorney's fees is presumed to have followed pro-
per considerations.' Although a court is presumed to be aware of
147. Vasby v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 46 Mont. 411, 423, 128 P. 686 (1912).
148. Huston v. Nuss, 19 Mont. 113, 114, 47 P. 643 (1897); Rumsey v. Spratt, 79 Mont.
158, 162, 255 P. 5 (1927).
149. State v. Sparks, 40 Mont. 82, 87, 105 P. 87 (1909) presumed that the jury drew no
inference from failure of defendant to testify; Kansier v. City of Billings, 56 Mont. 250, 257,
184 P. 630 (1919) presumed the jury considered the evidence; Hunt v. Van, 61 Mont. 395,
399, 202 P. 573 (1921) presumed the jury did not consider extraneous behavior of witness; and
Lingquist v. Seibold, 62 Mont. 162, 164, 199 P. 709 (1921) presumed that the jury disregarded
a witness's striken answer.
150. City of Butte v. School District, 29 Mont. 336, 339, 74 P. 869 (1903).
151. State v. Mayor of Butte, 69 Mont. 232, 236, 221 P. 524 (1923).
152. Ogle v. Town of Ronan, 112 Mont. 394, 396, 117 P.2d 257 (1941).
153. Murray v. Hauser, 21 Mont. 120, 125, 53 P. 99 (1898); State v. Sheppard, 23 Mont.
323, 324, 58 P. 868 (1899), decision made on proper foundation; Beach v. Spokane R.&W. Co.,
25 Mont. 367, 369, 65 P. 106 (1901), proper service made; Harrington v. Butte-Boston Mining
Co., 27 Mont. 1, 12, 69 P. 102 (1902), motion granted on presumed ground of insufficient
evidence; Friel v. Kimberly Montana Gold Mining Co., 34 Mont. 54, 59, 85 P. 734 (1906),
proper steps taken to settle statement for motion for new trial; Ettien v. Drum, 35 Mont. 81,
90, 88 P. 659 (1907), presumption that court had notice before passing on a motion; State ex
rel. Cohn v. District Court, 38 Mont. 119, 124, 99 P. 139 (1909), presumption of notice of intent
to move for new trial timely; Price v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 166, 170, 198 P. 439
(1921), presumption that an order for new trial based on minutes; Benjamin v. Helena Light
& Railway Co., 79 Mont. 144, 146, 255 P. 20 (1927), presumption in favor of trial court's action
even where affidavits for new trial conflict; Shoenborn v. Williams, 83 Mont. 477, 480, 272
P. 992 (1928), presumption that motion is denied when not heard within a specified time.
154. Lish v. Martin, 55 Mont. 582, 583, 179 P. 826 (1919); In re McGovern's Estate, 77
Mont. 182, 203, 250 P. 812 (1926).
155. Guerin v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 68 Mont. 365, 371, 218 P. 949 (1923).
156. State ex rel. State Board of Equalization v. Jacobson, 107 Mont. 461, 465, 86 P.2d
9 (1938); IBM Corp. v. Lewis & Clark County, 111 Mont. 384, 387, 112 P.2d 477 (1941).
157. In re Parsons' Estate, 35 Mont. 478, 482, 90 P. 163 (1907).
158. Forrester v. MacGinnis Mining Co., 29 Mont. 397, 409, 74 P. 1088 (1914).
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the value of an attorney's services, evidence may be allowed showing
what is just and reasonable.'59 However, where the record contains
no evidence as to whether attorney's fees are reasonable, it is pre-
sumed that the amount fixed by the court was correct.'
2. Constitutional and Statutory Construction
The constitutionality of statutes is presumed.'' In the area of
interpretation of language, words used in statutes and constitutions
are presumed to be used in their ordinary sense,' or in the sense
given them by another jurisdiction.'
Another technique of construction is to examine legislative in-
tent. In this area, several presumptions can help a court decide the
meaning to be given a statute. When a statute is amended, it is
presumed that the legislature intended to change existing law, al-
though a mere change of words may have been made to clarify
language." 4 However, it is presumed that the legislature is aware of
existing law relating to a subject when attempts are made to change
it, 's and that it understands the meaning of words used, and uses
them in their ordinary sense. 66 The legislature is presumed to pass
legislation which is reasonable, just and convenient.6 7 Where a par-
ticular class of persons is treated specially, it is presumed that there
were legitimate grounds of distinction. 68 The legislature is also pre-
sumed to act in good faith when estimating amounts of revenue and
appropriations,'69 and to know the conditions and policies of indus-
tries when making legislation. 7 " In interpreting the public policy of
the state, if the supreme court's interpretation of a particular policy
has not been changed in three legislative sessions, it will be pre-
sumed correct.' 7' As a general rule, retroactive laws are not favored,
for it is presumed that the legislature did not intend to establish a
new rule for past transactions, 72 and that statutes should operate
159. Hickey et al. v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 32 Mont. 143, 158, 79 P. 698 (1904).
160. Britt v. Powder Butte Mine, 108 Mont. 174, 180, 89 P.2d 266 (1939).
161. People ex rel. v. VanGaskin, 5 Mont. 352, 366, 6 P. 30 (1885).
162. State ex rel. Heinz v. Moody, 71 Mont..473, 481, 230 P. 575 (1924); Rider v. Cooney,
Gov., 94 Mont. 295, 309, 23 P.2d 261 (1933).
163. State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards et al., 42 Mont. 135, 143, 111 P. 734 (1910).
164. State ex rel. Rankin v. Wibaux County Bank, 85 Mont. 532, 540, 281 P. 341 (1929).
165. State ex rel. Escar v. District Court,. 56 Mont. 464, 467, 185 P. 157 (1919).
166. Helena Light and Ry. Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 57 Mont. 93, 113, 186 P.
702 (1920).
167. State ex rel. Mallott v. Board of Commissioners, 89 Mont. 37, 87, 296 P. 1 (1931).
168. Rutherford v. City of Great Falls, 107 Mont. 512, 520, 86 P.2d 656 (1939).
169. State ex rel. Tipton v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466, 475, 19 P.2d 227 (1933).
170. Leuthold v. Brendjord, 100 Mont. 96, 106, 47 P. 41 (1935).
171. State ex rel. Rankin v. Madison State Bank, 68 Mont. 342, 349, 218 P. 652 (1923).
172. Sullivan v. City of Butte, 65 Mont. 495, 498, 211 P. 301 (1922).
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prospectively." 3 In adopting the statute of another state, it is pre-
sumed that the legislature also adopts the interpretation given it by
the highest court of the other state,' and it is presumed the law of
another state is the same as the law of Montana on a particular
subject when no showing is made by the parties.' A statute is
presumed to be in force until its repeal is shown;'76 therefore when
a new statute conflicts with an existing one, the later statute is
merely deemed an exception to or qualification of the prior one.'"
A similar rule is that where there are two conflicting sections, they
are both presumed to be operative and to govern the title in which
they appear; courts will construe them together and attempt to
reconcile them . 78
3. Contracts
In construing the terms of a contract, courts may rely on these
presumptions: when a contract does not state the place of perform-
ance, it is presumed that payment is to be made at the creditor's
residence or place of business. 79 When not mentioned in the con-
tract, payment should be presumed to be required within a reasona-
ble time.'1 When terms are ambiguous it is presumed that parties
knew what was meant and would not be mistaken as to their own
intent.'' When services are rendered and received without a con-
tract, it is presumed that they were given in expectation of payment
and carry a promise to pay what they are worth.5 2 When there is a
breach of a building contract and the owner permits work to proceed
after expiration of the time for completion, it is presumed that he
waived the provision requiring a contract to be completed within
that time.181 It is presumed that grain contracts for future delivery
are not wagering contracts and are therefore lawful. 84 Where build-
ing materials were delivered in compliance with a contract, it is
presumed that they were used in the construction pursuant to the
173. State ex rel. Mills v. Dixon, 68 Mont. 526, 528, 219 P.2d 637 (1923).
174. Moreland v. Monarch Mining Co., 55 Mont. 419, 425, 178 P. 175 (1919).
175. State v. American Bank & Trust Co., 76 Mont. 445, 451, 247 P. 336 (1926).
176. Walker Motor Exchange v. Lindberg, 86 Mont. 513, 519, 284 P. 270 (1930).
177. Special Road District No. 8 v. Mills, 81 Mont. 86, 98, 261 P. 885 (1927); State ex
rel. Charette v. District Court, 107 Mont. 489, 495, 86 P.2d 750 (1939).
178. Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 322, 278 P. 1002 (1929).
179. Electrical Products Consolidated v. Goldstein, 97 Mont. 581, 585, 36 P.2d 1033
(1934).
180. Johnson v. Elliot, 123 Mont. 597, 604, 218 P.2d 703 (1950).
181. Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Beyer, 107 Mont. 1, 16, 79 P.2d 658 (1938).
182. San Antonio v. Spencer, 82 Mont. 9, 13, 264 P. 944 (1928).
183. Wortman v. Montana Central Ry., 22 Mont. 266, 289, 56 P. 316 (1899).
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contract.8 5 Finally, a court will presume that contracts required to
be in writing are in writing.186
4. Corporations
Corporate officers are presumed to have full authority to bind
a corporation 8 ' and a presumption of implied authority arises where
ratification, custom and acquiescence are shown. 8 ' When a contract
is executed by a corporation's general manager it is to be presumed
that of the corporation until a contrary showing is made.'
Knowledge of the corporation's affairs by the directors is pre-
sumed in favor of innocent third persons, but not in favor of officers
or other directors.' If a director is holding a bona fide claim against
a corporation, he may enforce it as any creditor might, and there is
no presumption of bad faith unless the director gains advantage
thereby.'' When a majority of directors are present at a stock-
holder's meeting and assent to an action, it is presumed that the
action has been ratified by the board of directors."2 The presump-
tion does not obtain that stockholders know the contents of records
of director's meetings or account books, and entries in such books
do not therefore impute knowledge to or ratification by them.'93
Finally, there exists a presumption that the acts of a corporation are
not ultra vires and that its bylaws are valid.'
5. Criminal Law
In criminal cases error will not be presumed to be prejudicial,"5
but if an accused shows he was denied the constitutional right of
public trial, such prejudice will be presumed. 9 ' Prior to the Crimi-
nal Code of 1973, in the absence of evidence establishing man-
slaughter, second degree murder was presumed when there was
proof the defendant committed homicide; the state must establish
deliberation for first degree murder.'97 It is presumed that a person
185. Rogers-Templeton Lumber Co. v. Welch, 56 Mont. 321, 329, 184 P. 838 (1919).
186. Sweetland v. Barrett, 4 Mont. 217, 223, 1 P. 745 (1882); Johnson v. Elliot, 123
Mont. 597, 603, 218 P.2d 703 (1950).
187. Tague v. John Caplice Co., 28 Mont, 51, 60, 72 P. 297 (1903).
188. Alley v. Butte & Western Mining Co., 77 Mont. 477, 492, 251 P. 517 (1926).
189. Wells-Dickey Co. v. Embody, 82 Mont. 150, 161, 266 P. 869 (1928).
190. Alward v. Broadway Gold Mining Co., 94 Mont. 45, 56, 20 P.2d 647 (1933).
191. Mayger v, St. Louis Mining Co., 68 Mont. 492, 501, 219 P. 1102 (1923).
192. Fitzpatrick v. O'Neill, 43 Mont. 552, 563, 118 P. 273 (1911).
193. Alward v. Broadway Gold Mining Co., supra note 190 at 54.
194. McMahon v. Cooney, Gov., et al., 95 Mont. 138, 145, 25 P.2d 131 (1933).
195. State v. Byrd, 41 Mont. 585, 592, 111 P. 407 (1910).
196. State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 214, 156 P. 1080 (1916).
197. State v. LeDuc, 89 Mont. 545, 562, 300 P. 919 (1931).
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in possession of a premises is also in possession of articles found
thereon.'"I
6. Damages
When a landlord enters the premises and intrudes upon a ten-
ant's family for a continued length of time, detriment and damages
are presumed.'99 When a jury allows exemplary damages, it is pre-
sumed that they found actual damages. ' " When a portion of the
purchase price sought as damages for breach of contract is the
agreed value of a used car turned in as payment, the presumption
attaches that such valuation is the actual value of the car. 0' It is
presumed that reasonably certain profits are within the mutual
understanding of parties and may be the basis for damages for
breach. '02
7. Fiduciary Relationships
It is presumed that a trustee bank used its own funds first when
mingling its funds with the beneficiary's, and that the remaining
sum belongs to the beneficiary. 03 Transactions of guardians are
viewed with distrust, and the presumption obtains that a ward acts
under the guardian's influence.0 4 Where parties in a fiduciary rela-
tionship are parent and adult child, the presumption that undue
influence was exerted in transactions does not always apply.20 5
8. Insurance
A policyholder is presumed to know the contents, conditions
and limitations of his policy.209 However, this presumption is limited
by R.C.M. 1947, § 40-5350, covering fraternal benefit societies' in-
surance policies, which states:
In any determination of the incompleteness or misleading charac-
ter of any comparison or statement, it shall be presumed that the
insured had no knowledge of any of the contents of the contract
involved.
An insurance agent is presumed to know the character and practice
198. State v. Daly, 77 Mont. 387, 393, 250 P. 976 (1926).
199. Welch v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 525, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
200. Id. at 527.
201. Evankovich v. Howard Pierce, Inc., 91 Mont. 344, 354, 8 P.2d 653 (1932).
202. Smith v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 377, 386, 39 P.2d 193 (1934).
203. Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Brown, 69 Mont. 140, 1 48, 220 P. 114 (1923).
204. In re Cuffe's Estate, 63 Mont. 399, 406, 207 P. 640 (1922).
205. Roecher, Administrator v. Story, 91 Mont. 28, 42, 5 P.2d 205 (1931).
206. Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 32 Mont. 329, 342, 80 P. 609 (1905).
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of businesses that he insures,"' and, in addition, it is presumed that
the type of business practices engaged in are contemplated when
entering into the insurance contract. 08 Insurance policies are pre-
sumed to contain mutually agreeable terms and all the undertak-
ings of the parties.20 In an action on a hail insurance policy it was
presumed that the plaintiff owned the crop in the absence of proof
to the contrary.2 10 An insurance company is presumed to have
waived forfeiture of a policy for non-compliance if the company
retained a premium paid two days after it was due.21' An insurance
company does not waive its security for a loan on a policy when it
keeps the application for the loan.212 In life insurance cases, a pre-
sumption arises against suicide and in favor of accidental death. 1 3
9. Justice Courts
There is no presumption in favor of the judgments of justice
courts 214 and no presumption in favor of their jurisdiction. 215 It is
presumed that a justice has administered the oath to a witness
before the witness testified.21
10. Libel and Slander
A publication libelous per se is presumed malicious and inju-
rious. 217 It is presumed that third parties understood allegedly slan-
derous words in their usual popular meaning. 28 In an action for
slander it is presumed the plaintiff has a good reputation. 19
11. Master-Servant
An employee can presume that his master is performing his
207. Park Saddle Horse Co. v. Royalty Indemnity Co., 81 Mont. 99, 110, 261 P. 880
(1927).
208. Id. at 111.
209. Austin v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 111 Mont. 192, 199, 108 P.2d 1036 (1940);
Baker v. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co., 81 Mont. 271, 278, 263 P. 93 (1928).
210. Pasherstnik v. Continental Ins. Co., 67 Mont. 19, 23, 214 P. 603 (1923).
211. Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 32 Mont. 329, 344, 80 P. 609 (1932).
212. Zimmerman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 90 Mont. 336, 343, 3 P.2d 278 (1931).
213. Withers v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 58 Mont. 485, 493, 193 P. 566 (1920);
Nichols v. New York Life Ins. Co., 88 Mont. 132, 140, 192 P. 253 (1930); Lewis v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 158, 124 P.2d 579 (1942).
214. Jenkins v. Carroll, 42 Mont. 302, 312, 112 P. 1064 (1910).
215. Layton v. Trapp, 20 Mont. 453, 455, 52 P. 208 (1897); General Oil Corp. v. Kelly,
94 Mont. 445, 450, 23 P.2d 555 (1933).
216. Mette and Kanne Distilling Co. v. Lowrey et al., 39 Mont. 124, 133, 101 P. 966
(1909).
217. Paxton v. Woodward, 31 Mont. 195, 208, 78 P. 215 (1904); Kelly v. Independent
Publishing Co., 45 Mont. 127, 141, 122 P. 735 (1912).
218. Daniel v. Moncure, 58 Mont. 193, 200, 190 P. 983 (1920).
219. Fowlie v. Cruse, 52 Mont. 222, 237, 157 P. 951 (1916).
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duty to provide for the former's safety,2 0 and the employer is pre-
sumed to use due care in supplying work equipment for his em-
ployee."' It is presumed that compensation paid to an employee is
for services performed which are similar to his regular duties and
within the scope of his employment.12 Where an employee uses his
employer's truck and the employer accrues some benefit, it is pre-
sumed that the employee was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment.2
12. Mining
The common law presumption of ownership of the land from
the sky to the center of the earth is overcome by the right to follow
the entire length of an ore vein.22'4 The quality and degree of a vein
does not overcome the presumption that a landowner owns the ore
beneath the surface of his land.225 The angle of a vein is presumed
the same both at the below the surface.22 1 The validity of a mining
claim is presumed, and its abandonment must be proved.
2 2
13. Municipal Government
It is presumed that a party contracting with a public board
knows its authority.228 City councils have only such powers as are
created by law and there is no presumption in favor of their power
to create special improvement districts.229 It is presumed that a city
has sufficient taxable property to cover all municipal bonds is-
sued.230 There is no presumption that sidewalks have been built
under a uniform plan,' 3 ' although it is presumed that municipal
sidewalks and roads are constructed so as to be safe.
2 32
14. Negligence
When one person is found negligent, the presumption obtains
220. McCabe v. Montana Central Ry., 30 Mont. 323, 333, 76 P. 701 (1904); Morelli v.
Twohy Bros., 54 Mont. 366, 376, 170 P. 757 (1918).
221. Forquer v. Slater Brick Co., 37 Mont. 426, 447, 97 P. 843 (1908).
222. Doane v. Marquisee, 63 Mont. 166, 171, 206 P. 420 (1922).
223. Monaghan v. Standard Motor Co., 96 Mont. 165, 173, 29 P.2d 278 (1934).
224. State ex rel. Parrott S & C Co. v. District Ct., 28 Mont. 528, 538, 73 P. 230 (1903).
225. Heinze et al. v. Boston & Montana Consolidated Mining Co., 30 Mont. 484, 488,
77 P. 421 (1904).
226. Barker v. Condon, 53 Mont. 585, 594, 165 P. 909 (1917).
227. Street v. Delta Mining Co., 42 Mont. 371, 385, 112 P. 701 (1910); Tripp v. Silver
Dike Mining Co., 70 Mont. 120, 125, 224 P. 272 (1924).
228. State ex rel. Stuerve v. Henson, 44 Mont. 429, 443, 120 P. 485 (1912).
229. Johnston v. City of Hardin, 55 Mont. 574, 579, 179 P. 824 (1919).
230. Clerihew v. City of Baker, 109 Mont. 317, 321, 96 P.2d 269 (1939).
231. Metz v. City of Butte, 27 Mont. 506, 509, 71 P. 761 (1903).
232. O'Flyn v. City of Butte, 26 Mont. 493, 501, 93 P. 643 (1908).
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that other persons acted in a reasonable manner.133 The presump-
tion of contributory negligence does not obtain because of a party's
knowledge of the offending instrumentality at the accident site; it
must be shown that he had a reason to apprehend danger.134 An
instruction that a tenant is presumed to know defects of the prem-
ises and that he rents subject thereto was properly refused where the
tenant fell on a sidewalk that had become icy through the neglect
of an adjacent property owner, for a nuisance cannot be maintained
by prescription.131
Certain fact situations have been held to give rise to a presump-
tion of negligence. One is when the cause of an accident is under the
control of defendant, and for lack of such control the accident would
not have happened. It is then presumed that the defendant was
negligent, with the result that the burden rests on him to prove
ordinary care.236 Negligence was presumed when a motorman did
not ring a bell when approaching an intersection and so caused an
accident. 237 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor had been viewed as a
presumption that, in the absence of explanatory evidence, the in-
jury suffered by the plaintiff was due to defendant's negligence.2 38
A person is presumed to see everything he can by looking straight
ahead and laterally; he must be vigilant to avoid negligence.2 39
15. Principal-Agent
It is presumed that an agent is hired only to make contracts and
not to rescind or modify contracts affecting his principal's rights or
obligations without his approval.2 41 When an agent acts openly for
himself or for another, one cannot presume that he imported knowl-
edge to his principal. 241 When an agent uses the word "I" in deal-
ings, the presumption that he is dealing for the principal is not
overcome.2 42 It is presumed that the relationship of principal-agent
continues in an absence of showing to the contrary; the principal
233. Daniels v. Granite Bimetallic C. Mining Co., 56 Mont. 284, 289, 184 P. 836 (1919),
miner charged with contributory negligence; Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co., 94 Mont. 204,
215, 21 P.2d 1105 (1933), occupants of a car; Cowden v. Crippen, 101 Mont. 187, 206, 53 P.2d
98 (1936), driver of a car.
234. Hughey v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 98, 106, 37 P.2d 1035 (1934); McCulloch v.
Horton, 105 Mont. 531, 541, 74 P.2d 1 (1937).
235. Toole v. Paumie Parisian Dye House, 98 Mont. 191, 202, 39 P.2d 965 (1934).
236. Hardisty v. Largey Lumber Co., 34 Mont. 151, 157, 86 P. 29 (1906).
237. McManus v. Butte Ry. Co., 68 Mont. 379, 391, 219 P. 241 (1923).
238. McGowan v. Nelson, 36 Mont. 67, 76, 92 P. 40 (1907); Maki v. Murray Hospital,
91 Mont. 251, 263, 7 P.2d 228 (1932).
239. Autio, Administratrix v. Miller, 92 Mont. 150, 165, 11 P.2d 1039 (1932).
240. Benema v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 94 Mont. 138, 148, 21 P.2d 69 (1933).
241. Comerford v. U.S. F.&G. Co., 59 Mont. 243, 257, 196 P. 984 (1921).
242. Bachman v. Gerer, 64 Mont. 28, 34. 200 P. 891 (1922).
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must show termination."' Similarly, when an act by an agent was
not repudiated, it was presumed that that act was ratified by the
principal.4 The presumption that the agent was acting within the
scope of his employment at the time of an accident is raised by
slight facts. '45
16. Sanity
The presumption of sanity is overcome whenever sufficient evi-
dence is introduced to cast reasonable doubt on defendant's mental
state. 4 ' Persons are presumed to be of sound mind when entering
transactions. 4 ' When insanity is established, it is presumed to con-
tinue to exist until there is a showing to the contrary. '48
17. Tax
Taxes are presumed valid. 4 ' A state's taxing power is never
presumed to be relinquished.2 51 Courts presume the legislature cor-
rectly classified property for tax purposes and did not intend to
grant special privileges.25' Fraud by taxing officials is never
presumed.2 52 It is presumed that non-resident land owners take no-
tice of the fact that if taxes are not paid annually, their property
will be sold at a tax sale.2 13 When a taxpayer cannot prove he paid
a tax for a given year, it is presumed that he paid his taxes upon a
showing that he had paid them for a series of years and that the
particular year's taxes were not included in the tax bill for the
following years.254 For tax purposes, intangible personal property is
presumed to have its situs at the owner's domicile.2 55
243. Exchange State Bank v. Occident Elevator Co., 95 Mont. 78, 89, 24 P.2d 126
(1933).
244. Miller v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 101 Mont. 212, 225, 53 P.2d 704 (1936).
245. Monaghan v. Standard Motor Co., 96 Mont. 165, 173, 29 P.2d 178 (1934), where
the employer accrued slight incidental benefit; Eliason v. Geil Agency, 114 Mont. 97, 99, 132
P.2d 158 (1942), where driver of car is car owner's employee.
246. State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 372, 59 P. 169 (1899).
247. Sommerville v. Greenhood, 65 Mont. 101,114,210 P. 1048 (1922); Lacy v. Harmon,
137 Mont. 489, 493, 353 P.2d 96 (1960).
248. In re Murphy's Estate, 43 Mont. 353, 373, 116 P. 1004 (1911); In re Estate of
Redfern, 64 Mont. 49, 57, 208 P. 1072 (1922).
249. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Ravalli County, 52 Mont. 422, 426, 158 P. 682
(1916).
250. Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258, 267, 175 P. 878 (1918); Valley County v. Thomas,
109 Mont. 345, 372, 97 P.2d 345 (1939).
251. Hiljer v. Moore, County Treas., 56 Mont. 146, 175, 182 P. 477 (1919).
252. Danforth v. Livingston, 23 Mont. 558, 563, 59 P. 916 (1900); State v. State Bd. of
Equal., 56 Mont. 413, 455, 186 P. 697 (1920).
253. Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 395, 103 P.2d 303 (1940).
254. Smith v. Blaine County, 102 Mont. 116, 119, 56 P.2d 179 (1936).
255. Monidah Trust v. Sheehan, 45 Mont. 424, 430, 123 P. 692 (1912).
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18. Wills
The presumption of proper execution is raised when a will is
proved and admitted to probate 51 When one makes a will it is
presumed that one intends to dispose of one's entire estate, so that
the will should be construed in that manner. 57 When used in a will,
the word "relatives" is presumed to mean such relatives as are heirs
under the law, unless a contrary intention is apparent from the
context.2 58 When a lost will was last seen in the testator's possession,
it is presumed that he destroyed it.5' A presumption exists against
intestacy, and courts will sustain a will if it is possible to do so, every
presumption arising in favor of its execution.6 0
III. CONCLUSION
Presumptions can be useful in determining issues in a case and
in establishing who has the burden of proof as to those issues. They
can also save time during trials by not requiring the introduction of
evidence on an issue or requiring the trier of fact to consider that
issue where the result would be consistent with the probabilities.
Unfortunately, presumptions are not easily found or recognized.
Therefore this compilation is intended as a research aid for practic-
ing lawyers in Montana.
This compilation does not represent a complete list of all pre-
sumptions existing in Montana. Such a list would be nearly impos-
sible to assemble. A more complete list of statutes may be found as
part of the Proposed Montana Rules of Evidence, appended as
Table C. The cases cited in this article as common law presump-
tions are only a sample of those found in Table C, which in turn is
only intended as an adequate representation of cases for those pre-
sumptions.
256. In re Silver's Estate, 98 Mont. 141, 156, 38 P.2d 277 (1934).
257. In re Sprigg's Estate, 70 Mont. 272, 275, 225 P. 617 (1924).
258. In re Bernheim's Estate, 82 Mont. 198, 208, 266 P. 378 (1928).
259. In re Colbert's Estate, 31 Mont. 461, 468, 78 P. 971 (1904).
260. In re Bragg's Estate, 106 Mont. 132, 140, 76 P.2d 57 (1938).
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